This paper focuses on the analysis of the 2008 financial crisis and how it affects the global financial markets. We analyze three major markets (US, UK, and ASIA) that are represented by the levels of three broad stock indices S&P 500, FTSE 100 and Hang Seng respectively. Our methodology is based on cointegration analysis and Granger causality test in order to examine the interaction between the markets (information flows). Additionally, we study the volatility transmission based on multivariate GARCH analysis. We find significant changes in information flows before and during the financial crisis.
Introduction
Due to its surprising breadth and intensity, the analysis of the 2008 global financial crisis presents a major challenge for economists and financial experts. Policymakers now consider the definition of key policy responses and institutional rules in order to build mechanisms that will contain cross-market contagion and prevent a reoccurrence of the problem in the future. Most of the recent crises 1 started from emerging markets, which are presumably more sensitive to liquidity shocks because of their underdeveloped and illiquid financial markets and their large public deficits. Besides the 1987 crash in Wall Street that was technical and short-lived in nature, the 2008 crisis is the first to be labelled a US crisis on the basis that it seems to have started by the massive US real estate delinquencies.
An important question related to an international financial crisis is the existence of contagion (i.e., the international propagation of country-or region-specific shocks to other parts of the world). According to the more open definition adopted by Forbes and Rigobon [1], contagion is measured as any change in the transmission mechanisms that occurs during a volatile period. For example, contagion may establish itself by a significant increase in cross-market correlations.
Yet to date, there is still a lot of disagreement as to what are the channels through which financial upheaval is transmitted across countries, and on the set of measurable factors that may be used for the precise identification of a contagion event. Understanding these factors is important because early recognition of the possibility of contagion may help reduce a country's vulnerability to externallyoriginated shocks.
In the wake of the current financial international crash, growing integration of financial markets has been of heightened interest because such integration is assumed to generate large, correlated price movements across most stock markets. Yet due to the complexity and global nature of the current financial crisis, it is difficult to move beyond the headlines of the financial press and provide an in depth analysis of the mechanism that links global financial markets during the crisis and generates the phenomenon of contagion.
The analysis may take place on both the economics of the crisis, as well as on a purely statistical manner. On the economic front, in the US for example, the fight has produced what is termed "a highly accommodative monetary policy." What is truly meant by this deceptively soft phrase is that since the onset of the financial crisis nearly two years ago, the Federal Reserve has reduced the cost of funds for big US banks nearly to zero. This has happened by adjusting the interest-rate target for overnight lending between banks (the so called Fed-funds rate). 1 The most well known financial and currency crises that have occurred over the last 25 years with global consequences were, the 1992 European monetary unit problems, the peso effect of 1994, and the 1997 Asian "flu" crisis (which also triggered the 1998 Russian "cold"). The 1999 Brazilian devaluation, the 2000 Internet bubble burst, and the July 2001 default of Argentina.
Having brought the Fed-funds rate to almost zero, the US (and later the UK) switched to the more aggressive policy of Quantitative Easing, which is also described as "printing money out of thin air". This led to an explosion of the size of the US Fed balance sheet, mainly through the purchase of long-term securities, initially aimed at restarting the flow of credit and to soften the economic impact of the financial crisis for the US. Such actions were not paralleled elsewhere in Europe or Asia so it is interesting to understand the linkage dynamics that were produced.
In the current paper we employ an intuitive and straightforward statistical analysis for testing if contagion occurs by simply comparing cross-market linkages between markets during a relatively stable period before the turbulent period, with linkages during the crisis. We examine the short-run dynamics of returns and volatility for stocks traded in the US, British and Hong Kong stock exchanges during the relatively short last six year period. The main focus of the study is Granger causality among the three markets, which is a statistical concept of causality that is based on prediction. According to Granger causality, if a market "Granger-causes" (or "G-causes") another market, then past returns of the 1 st market should contain information that helps predict returns of the 2 nd above and beyond the information contained in past values of the 2 nd market alone.
We first find a strongly significant cointegration coefficient for the index levels before and during the financial crisis period for all market pairs (US-UK, US-Asia and UK-Asia), which implies a long run equilibrium level of interaction. We then proceed to the main finding of the paper: a change in the direction of the information flow during the financial crisis as this is established by Granger causality. As expected, due to overlapping operating hours and the strong ties between the markets, there is simultaneous interaction between the US and UK. Since the Asian markets precede the US with no overlap, Asian returns today ought to include an unrevealed component also present in yesterday's US returns.
2 Yet, before the financial crisis, we can reject the hypothesis of the US market causing the Asian markets (at a daily level); this shows a particularly weak pre-crisis interaction. Surprisingly, when we test the null that US G-causes Asia with a sample which includes the financial crisis, we find that the US market includes information about Asia. This provides evidence of a newly produced channel of information from the US to Asia and, to our knowledge, the first statistical verification that the 2008 crisis was a crisis truly "…made in the US." The opening of this new channel of information flow from the US to Asia is a clear indication that during the financial crisis period the ability of the US markets to produce, capture and disseminate crisis specific information was unmatched by the financial markets in other regions of the world.
We finally move to understand the volatility transmission mechanism over time and across the three different markets during the crisis. Our methodology is to examine the dynamic relationship between the daily stock market returns and their volatilities, for the three markets above, using a multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) model. This is essentially a family of statistical models originally developed by and Bollerslev [6, 7] . We find that the markets interact not only in a returns level but to some extend through volatility spillovers. The UK and Asian markets were insignificantly correlated before and during the crisis. For the US and Asian markets, changing information flows due to the crisis, manifested through Granger causality for US→Asia, is not corroborated by a change in the significance of the correlation coefficient. Finally, the US and UK are the only significantly correlated markets.
Data Analysis and Descriptive Statistics
The dataset used includes the closing levels of the daily stock market indices for three major stock markets (US, UK and Hong Kong). We use the S&P 500 index for the US, the FTSE100 for the UK and the Hang Seng index as a proxy for the Asian markets. Furthermore, we examine the econometrics of these series in two data samples. The first sample, with data not contaminated with the crisis, runs from April 2002 to April 2006; i.e., ends before the onset of the financial crisis. The second sample, from April 2002 to April 2009, includes at least the first 18 to 20 months of the crisis depending on when one places its beginning. We compute the daily stock returns for each index as the first difference of logarithmic levels. Tables 1(a) and (b) report return summary statistics for the two time intervals. Table 1(a) includes the time space before the financial crisis (FC from now on) and Table 1 As we can see from Table 1(a), Asia gives the highest mean return while it is characterized by lower volatility with positive skewness and no excess kurtosis in compare with US and UK. US gives the second higher mean return with the second lower volatility. Additionally, it is skewed to the right with no excess kurtosis. The most risky market is the UK market in the time interval before the FC, while it seems to give the lower mean returns with negative skewness and excess kurtosis.
We get the results as they are shown in Table 1 (b), including the time period of FC in our analysis. The FC gives the opposite side of the coin while ASIA, as it is represented by the Hang Seng index, is shown to be the most aggressive market in comparison with the US and UK. Asia gives the highest mean returns with the highest standard deviation, while it remained skewed to the right. US and UK both exhibit negative average returns when the FC period is included in the sample. Finally, all three markets exhibit excess kurtosis. 
Methodology
It is well known that testing for cointegration is a means for correctly testing hypotheses concerning the relationship between two indices that have unit roots. In an effort to firstly determine if the time series is covariance stationary we employ the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test [8, 9] for a unit root. We will then test for cointegration. Firstly, we employ a unit root test in order to check for nonstationarity between our time series. We then test for a significant cointegration coefficient between each market pairs. Moreover, we test for Granger causality in each pair of the series in order to investigate the interaction flows among the markets before and during the financial crisis time horizon. Finally we apply a DVEC (1, 1) model and a CCC model in order to capture the volatility transmission by examining the changes in the correlation and covariance coefficients.
Testing for Unit Roots
We have to determine the order of integration of stock price series before we test for cointegration. For this propose, we consider an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for each of our time series. So, the test procedure is described by the following equations about the US, UK and Asian markets: [11] and not from the classical t-distribution. Tables 2(a) and (b) show the test results; the null hypothesis of nonstationarity cannot be rejected for all the markets and for both time horizons. So, all time series (US t , UK t , HS t ) can be assumed to be I(1) which means that we should take the first difference (i.e., continuously compounded index returns) in order to achieve stationarity.
Testing for Cointegration
We concluded on integrated of order one I(1) level series in the previous section. In this section, we test for cointegration on each pair of processes in order to determine the existence of long-run equilibria. A significant cointegration coefficient implies a long-run equilibrium relationship. Then, even though our data generating processes contain unit root, they are going to move closely together with the difference between them will be stationary [11] . We employ the Engle and Granger test procedure [12] in order to test for cointegration:
1st step: We have to test if our series are I(1). 2nd step: We run the regressions between (US t /UK t , US t /HS t , UK t /HS t ) in both periods (before and after FC). Our regression models are: 
where the null is:
The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4, where we reject the null (no cointegration) at all lags for all market pairs. The financial crisis does not affect the existence of long-run relationship among the three markets.
Information Flow
Even if the financial crisis did not affect the long-run relationship of the markets, it may still have affected the flow of information (the direction of interaction) between them. As we discussed already, we find cointegration between (US/UK), (US/HS) and (UK/HS) markets. Yet, we don't know the direction of information flow (direction of interaction) between the markets.
As is well known Granger causality from X to Y does not indicate causality in the proper common use of the term (i.e., it does not imply that the Y series is the effect or the result of X series). Instead, Granger causality truly measures precedence and information flow, so that in our context here of the recent financial crisis Granger causality from a country X to country Y implies that information during the crisis flows from X to Y. Alternatively, we may think of developments in X preceding developments in Y.
Our aim in this section is to describe the dynamic interaction between the markets and to see the independent movements before we proceed to volatility modelling. It is a crucial aspect of a proper analysis of the crisis to analyze the cycle of information before we move to the next level of volatility analysis.
We separate our markets in three bi-variate VAR processes [13] 
Alternatively, in the absence of Granger causality, our series are generated by an AR(1) process as follows: 
Estimation and Testing
We have already described an assumed regression structure for our series. We perform maximum likelihood and ( on. 
And the corresponding log-likelihood is given by:
Based on Engle [14] the Wald and LR statistics are asymptotically equivalent and we ma thus use two in order to test for causality.
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The likelihood ratio and Wald statistics are given ectively as follows: Table 5 presents the results from the Granger causality test for all our series before the financial crisis (FC period) and including the financia major finding is that, as we will explain, information flows and precedence of information have changed when xamining data before and including the financial crisis.
Empirical Results
financial data from the three uring the UK market hours. is thu strongly ejected While it was very diffic ormation to flow at:
HS market does not precede the UK
has a p-value of 0.0289 and is rejected. It will actually be impossible for information released during the US hours he US." he dram from the US to Asia is registered in the precipitous drop of the p-value (2775 times lower than the p-value that excludes the crisis). This drop is a clear indic financial crisis period the ability o markets to produce, capture and disseminate crisis spefic information was unmatched by the financial markets in other regions of the world.
At the same time, due to the operating hours' overlap between the US and the UK, we reject the null that US t does not inst t riods and we conclude that there is a simultaneous interaction between the two markets. Moreover, the Asian market affects UK market but the opposite is not true. We are going to accept (cannot reject) the null of no G-causality from UK to Asia. This means that while it seems Asia affects UK, at the same time it is not affected by UK. This result remains significant during the FC horizon. Before FC, the Asian market did G-cause the US market but the opposite flow did not exist in the sense that the US market did not G-cause Asian markets. When we include the FC period in the analysis, we find an instantaneous interaction betw hich means that we strongly reject the null of no Granger cause effect.
H is the covariance matrix and its diagonal elements constitute the variance co , mponents of (FTSE, HS, SP) while the cross products are the covariance elements between the series. The element (h 21,t ) expresses the tim correlation between (HS, FTSE), (h 31,t ) expresses the tim between (SP, HS).
The matrix (C) contains the constant term ) contain the ARCH and GARCH coefficients respectively Furthermore, we d covariance with the above modelling procedure, but we have not yet a clear view about the correlation between the markets an ction of information flows as we described in the previous section. It is necessary to test the conditional covariance for significance, with a formal structure of the correlation coeff This test can be done by using the Constant Correlation Coefficient (CCC) model [17] that is based on the following specification structure for conditional covariance: 6 The Diagonal VECH model essentially writes the covariance matrix as a set of univariate GARCH models. 7 For more details see [16] . Copyright © 2010 SciRes. ME , , , , , , ,
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If we combine the above finding with the G-cause findings, we conclude that the UK and Asian markets were insignificantly positive correlated (R 12 ) before and remained so during the Financial Crisis. On the other hand, we cannot observe any insignificant difference in the correlation (significant correlation coefficient) between the US and UK (R 13 ) markets while the conditional correlation between the US and the Asian market (R 23 ) remains strongly insignificant before and during the FC period. Thus it seems that information is transmitted in part through market returns and partly also through volatility spillovers in the case of US/UK.
Conclusions
An empirical objective of this paper was to examine the existence and source of the strong inter-market co-movements that are suggested by financial analysts during the 2008 financial crisis. We analyzed levels and stock returns for three indices (FTSE100, Hang Seng and S&P500) that represent three major financial markets that constitute a major fraction of the world capitalization. We believe that these three stock markets are representative of the European, Asian and US markets respectively.
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